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Preemption Provisions, HMO
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By ELAINE GARERI KENNEY, R.N., M.S.*
"A hyperbolic wag is reputed to have said that E.R.I.S.A. stands for
'Everything Ridiculous Imagined Since Adam.' This court does not
take so dim a view of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. Instead, this court is willing to believe that ERISA has
lurking somewhere within it a redeeming feature."1
WHEN FLORENCE CORCORAN learned she was pregnant in 1989,
she and her husband were excited but apprehensive. Their last child
had almost not survived-weeks before the baby was due, he went into
fetal distress and required delivery by an emergency caesarian
section. 2
This time though, precautions were taken. Mrs. Corcoran's preg-
nancy was characterized appropriately as high risk.3 Accordingly, to-
wards the end of her pregnancy, her doctor ordered her hospitalized
until the baby's birth in order to monitor the fetus.4 Nevertheless, af-
ter a few days of hospitalization she was discharged because her
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"),5 United HealthCare, de-
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1. Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 832
F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
2. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322, 1323 n.1 (5th Cir.
1992).
3. See id. at 1322.
4. See id. at 1322-23.
5. In the health care industry, the term "Health Maintenance Organization" has
been defined as "[a] prepaid organized delivery system where the organization and the
primary care physicians assume some financial risk for the care provided to its enrolled
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termined that her hospitalization was not medically necessary. 6 As an
alternative to hospitalization, United HealthCare authorized up to ten
hours per day of home nursing care for Mrs. Corcoran. However, trag-
ically, while no nurse was present, the baby went into fetal distress and
died.7
The Corcoran couple filed a wrongful death action in Louisiana
state court.8 Because the health care benefits in dispute were provided
under a federally-governed plan, United HealthCare was able to de-
fend successfully on the basis that the state law claim was preempted
by federal law.9 That federal law is the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"). Because ERISA has no provisions for a wrong-
ful death action, the case was dismissed, and its ruling was subse-
quently upheld by the Fifth Circuit on appeal.' 0
ERISA was enacted in 1974 as a response to fraud and abuse that
occurred in employee pension funds.'1 At the time, it was hailed as a
much-needed reform of the entire employee pension fund system. 12
Although most of ERISA's provisions govern the administration of em-
ployer-offered pension funds, it also regulates non-pension employee
benefits such as disability and health insurance plans.13 As a result,
those seventy-three million Americans, like the Corcorans, who obtain
health care through an employer-offered benefit plan contracted
through an outside provider are subject to these provisions.1 4 In the
area of health care, ERISA's promise of protection has not been real-
ized. Instead, ERISA has misguidedly harmed these interests.
Under ERISA, a civil action may be brought by a plan participant
or beneficiary only "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."1 5 Extra-con-
members." Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy
for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 75, 96 (1993).
6. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 1325.
10. See id. at 1339.
11. See June M. Sullivan, Comment, Overcoming the ERISA Barrier to Recovery Against
HMOs: Current Trends and Legislation, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245, 251 (2001).
12. See Arnold R. Levinson, The Tragedies of ERISA's Unintended Preemption of
State Law Remedies 20 (July 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pillsbury &
Levinson, LLP, San Francisco, Cal.).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1), (3) (2000).
14. Linda Greenhouse, Court, 5-4, Upholds Authority of States To Protect Patients, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2002, at Al.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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tractual damages such as compensatory or punitive damages are not
allowed. 16 In the Corcoran case, the remedy under ERISA would there-
fore be limited to the cost of the few days of hospitalization that Mrs.
Corcoran was denied. When the inadequacy of this remedy is con-
trasted with the magnitude of the loss of a child, the inequity is star-
tling. Though it did not alter the harsh result of their ruling, the
Corcoran court aptly commented on this inadequacy, acknowledging
the painful reality:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have
been a serious mistake. This is troubling for several reasons. First, it
eliminates an important check on the thousands of medical deci-
sions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review system.
With liability rules generally inapplicable, there is theoretically less
deterrence of substandard medical decisionmaking.
Finally, cost containment features.., did not exist when Con-
gress passed ERISA. While we are confident that the result we have
reached is faithful to Congress's intent neither to allow state-law
causes of action that relate to employee benefit plans nor to pro-
vide beneficiaries in the Corcorans' position with a remedy under
ERISA.... [f]undamental changes such as the widespread institu-
tion of utilization review would seem to warrant a reevaluation of
ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble purpose of safe-
guarding the interests of employees. 17
An ERISA provision known as the "savings clause" exempts state
laws that "regulate insurance" from ERISA preemption.' 8 In the re-
cently-decided Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,19 the Court held
for the first time that an HMO is an insurer and that some state laws
regulating HMOs are therefore protected from preemption under the
savings clause. 20 On one hand this decision heralded advancement for
health care consumers' rights. Unfortunately, however, the Court cre-
ated an untenable position for HMO state law when it inferred that it
would not exempt state insurance/HMO laws from preemption when
the laws offered remedies in excess of those provided under ERISA.21
16. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 958 (2000).
17. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 735
(1985).
19. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
20. See id. at 367.
21. See id. at 386 (indicating that unlike Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), and Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), where the Court commented that the state
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Given this latter aspect of the decision, if the Corcoran case were heard
today, it would likely not turn out differently. This comment suggests
that when a court determines that a claim under a state HMO law is
spared from ERISA preemption because it "regulates insurance," it
should recognize that the existence of remedies that exceed those of
ERISA should not counteract this determination.
By determining that state HMO laws "regulate insurance" and
thus are saved from ERISA preemption, yet precluding those same
state HMO laws from preemption if their remedial provisions exceed
those of ERISA's, the Rush Court has created an inconsistency and
severely narrowed the application of the savings clause. At the time of
ERISA's creation, health care was the province of state law and health
coverage was obtained primarily through insurance. 22 By excluding
from preemption those state laws that regulated insurance, Congress
attempted to exclude health care benefits such as these from ERISA
oversight.2 3 However, this purpose cannot be fulfilled if the Court lim-
its the state's purview to only those laws without significant remedies.
This comment proposes that the inconsistency found in Rush can
nonetheless result in a positive outcome. The Court's current untena-
ble analysis of savings clause issues, exposed to further scrutiny, can
lead to a truer interpretation of ERISA, one in harmony with its dual
purposes of protecting worker's rights and reserving to the states
those matters traditionally considered as under state authority.
This comment discusses how to 1) remove the barriers to recov-
ery under state law for ERISA-governed health care plan participants
with claims related to wrongfully-denied medical care and 2) ensure
that managed care organizations such as HMOs are held accountable
for decisions made as to medical necessity. Part I presents a back-
ground on ERISA. Part II examines the Rush decision with regard to
ERISA preemption. Part III argues that once a state law claim is deter-
mined to be exempt from ERISA preemption under the savings
clause, any additional impliedly preemptive force of ERISA's civil en-
forcement provisions ("section 502")24 is inapplicable.
laws at issue there problematically provided remedies in excess of those of ERISA, Moran's
claim involved a state law imposing no new remedies in excess of ERISA provisions).
22. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 251.
23. See id.
24. ERISA section 502 "civil enforcement" is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). See
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
THE BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, at xvii (Michael
G. Kushner &Janet K. Song, eds., 2001) (indexing ERISA sections with United States Code
sections).
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The following four reasons are offered in support of this conten-
tion. First, neither ERISA's text, nor its legislative history, supports a
limitation regarding remedies on a law saved from preemption. Sec-
ond, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the preemp-
tive effect of section 502 on state law otherwise exempted by the
savings clause is dicta. Third, applying established principles of statu-
tory interpretation, any impliedly preemptive effect of section 502 is
inapplicable to the savings clause. Fourth, applying conflict preemp-
tion doctrine, section 502 is inapplicable to the savings clause.
Part IV offers suggestions for needed legislative reform of ERISA
and further proposes that in the absence of such changes, the judici-
ary should apply ERISA law in the context of current health care reali-
ties unanticipated when ERISA was enacted. Part V concludes with the
assertion that because ERISA was not enacted with the intent to gov-
ern litigation involving claims against HMOs for wrongfully denied
medical treatment, state HMO laws-remedial or otherwise-deter-
mined to be saved from preemption because they regulate insurance
are the appropriate vehicle by which to adjudicate these matters.
I. ERISA Background
ERISA, notorious for its complexity and ambiguity, is a 700-page
federal statute with 3,600 pages of published regulations. 25 It came
about at a time when the country was rocked with highly publicized
reportings of fraud and mismanagement of employee pension funds,
resulting in workers losing retirement benefits they had worked a life-
time to accumulate. 26 Accordingly, legislative efforts devoted to the
reform of employee pension fund administration produced ERISA.27
ERISA's scope comprised the regulation of all employee welfare bene-
fit plans and the rights of beneficiaries under these plans.28 Upon its
signing by President Ford on Labor Day in 1974, ERISA was touted as
the pension "bill of rights."29 Despite its title, and primary focus on
25. Michael S. Sirkin, The 20 Year History of ERISA, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 321, 321-22
(1994).
26. BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw 419 (2d ed. 2000).
27. Id.
28. See Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA Preemption in the
Age of Managed Care, 9 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 433, 441 (1998).
29. Larry J. Pittman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdica-
tion ofJudicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355, 359 (1994) (citing 120 CONG. REC.
29,935 (1974) (statement of Senator Javits)); see also THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFA Rs,
INC., supra note 24, at v.
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the regulation of employee pension fund benefits, 30 ERISA applies to
any employee benefit plan maintained by an employer.31
In the area of non-pension employee welfare plan benefits, ER-
ISA's promise of protection has not been realized. In fact, ERISA has
misguidedly harmed these interests. Because of ERISA, managed care
organizations such as HMOs and Preferred Provider Organizations
("PPOs")32 are shielded from liability for extra-contractual damages
that would otherwise be in effect under state law. In commenting on
the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of ERISA, the court in
Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.3 3 noted that "[t]hrough pecu-
liar federal judicial interpretation, a statutory addition to workers'
rights has been converted into a statutory removal of those rights. The
law has been shaped into a form that achieves the converse of its origi-
nal purpose. '34 Moreover, the sweeping dominance of federal pre-
emption under ERISA can be said to threaten longstanding principles
of federalism.35
The interrelationship of three ERISA provisions is central to un-
derstanding ERISA's effect on HMO claims: 1) the express preemp-
tion clause, 36 2) the savings clause,3 7 and 3) the civil enforcement
provisions. 38 First, ERISA's preemption clause states that it "shall su-
persede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."' 39 ERISA recognizes as an em-
ployee benefit plan either an "employee welfare benefit plan" or an
"employee pension benefit plan. ' 40 An "employee welfare benefit
plan" is defined as: "any plan, fund or program which . . . [is] main-
tained by an employer.. . for the purpose of providing for its partici-
pants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
31. See id. § 1101.
32. A Preferred Provider Organization is a form of managed health care that operates
more loosely than an HMO in that plan members have a choice of obtaining services from
either plan-sponsored providers or, at a higher price, from independent providers not affil-
iated with the plan. See RAND E. ROSENBLA1T ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 552 (1997).
33. 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991).
34. Id. at 392 (Doggett, J., concurring).
35. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 955.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
37. Id. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
38. Id. § 1132(a).
39. Id. § 1144(a).
40. Id. § 1002(3).
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otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or bene-
fits in the event of sickness, accident, [etc.] ."4
Although the issue of whether an HMO law "relates to" an em-
ployee benefit plan has been the subject of at least twenty Supreme
Court opinions, this issue is not in controversy here.42 Justice Scalia
noted in 1997 that with regard to ERISA, "our prior decisions have not
succeeded in bringing clarity to the law."
43
The second provision is ERISA's savings clause. It states:
"[N] othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance ....
Thus for health care benefits claims, the issue of whether a state law
affecting an HMO is one that "regulates insurance" becomes crucial.
As will be explored further in Rush,45 infra, the Court, in a decision
applauded by health care consumers, held for the first time that be-
41. Id. § 1002(1).
42. See Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001);
UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical
Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); N.Y. State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S' 86 (1993); D.C. v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133
(1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989);
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Pack-
ing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724
(1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Holland v. Bur-
lington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986) (mem.); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F. 2d 320
(2d Cir. 1985), affd mem., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978). Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court recently granted consolidated review of two appeals from Roark v.
Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (2002): Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 462
(Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 02-1845), and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. v. Calad, cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 463 (Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 08-83).
43. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
45. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
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cause an HMO is both a medical services provider and an insurer, the
state HMO law at issue was saved from preemption. 46
The relationship between ERISA's express preemption provision
and its savings clause was explored in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts.47 However, the Court found little guidance in ERISA's
legislative history. The Court noted that there was no discussion in
ERISA's legislative history of the relationship between the two provi-
sions.48 In fact, there was little discussion of the savings clause at all.49
The third relevant provision is ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
(section 502), which provides exceedingly limited remedies. 50 It states
that a civil action may be brought by a plan participant or beneficiary
"to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan."5 1 Under ERISA, no ex-
tra-contractual damages are allowed. 52 Furthermore, because the stat-
ute restricts those with standing to bring suit under ERISA to
participants or beneficiaries, 53 these rights do not survive death, leav-
ing survivors without recourse under ERISA.
The significance of section 502's limitations can be shown by the
following hypothetical. An ERISA-governed patient with a difficult-to-
diagnose condition seeks treatment from his HMO. In the interests of
cost-containment, the HMO determines that the non-standard diag-
nostic test requested by the patient's physician is medically unneces-
sary and denies coverage for it. As a result, ten days elapse before the
correct diagnosis is made and proper treatment can begin. Although,
fortunately, the patient survives, the delay in diagnosis causes the pa-
tient irreversible damage. The patient is left unable to work, facing
the reality of lifelong medical care and a shorted life expectancy.
Under ERISA, the patient's only option is to bring an action to re-
cover for the cost of the denied benefit, in this case the cost of the
diagnostic test. Even if he prevails, he is not assured of recovering
attorney fees, and furthermore, he is left entirely without compensa-
46. See id. at 367.
47. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
48. Id. at 745.
49. Id.
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B).
51. Id.
52. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (stating that ERISA section 409(a)
does not provide a cause of action for extra-contractual damages to a beneficiary caused by
the improper or untimely processing of a benefit claim).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).
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tion for his injuries. More troublesome still, the HMO is shielded
from liability by the inadvertent effects of ERISA law. As a result, the
incentive customarily provided to an HMO by state regulatory and tort
law to apply greater care to medical and cost-containment decisions is
removed. It would come as no surprise if such a patient were to con-
clude that the legal system failed not just him, but the interests of
justice.
II. Rush v. Moran5
4
Debra Moran was a beneficiary of Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.
("Rush") through her husband's employer-provided, ERISA-governed
health care benefits plan.5 5 After a course of non-surgical treatment
for Moran's painful shoulder condition proved ineffective, her pri-
mary care physician recommended she obtain an unconventional sur-
gery that could only be done by a specialist unaffiliated with Rush. 56
Rush denied the costly procedure on the grounds that it was medically
unnecessary. 57 After pursuing an internal medical review, which af-
firmed the denial, Moran next requested an independent medical re-
view as guaranteed under the Illinois HMO Act. 58 However, Rush
refused, until Moran obtained a court order that compelled Rush to
perform the review.5 9
While the suit to compel the review was pending, a suffering Mo-
ran undertook the surgery at her own cost.60 As a result she expanded
her complaint against Rush to request reimbursement costs. 6 1 The
court-ordered independent medical review concluded that Moran's
surgery had been medically necessary, 62 requiring under state law that
Rush pay the costs.6 5 Rush refused to pay the costs, having successfully
removed the case to federal court on the basis that Moran's claim was
for ERISA benefits, and thus preempted under ERISA's civil enforce-
ment scheme.6 4
54. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
55. Id. at 359.
56. Id. at 360.
57. Id.
58. HMO Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2001).
59. Rush, 536 U.S. at 361-62.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 363.
62. Id. at 362-63.
63. Id. at 361.
64. Id. at 362-63.
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The district court agreed with Rush regarding the ERISA preemp-
tion and dismissed the case. 65 On appeal by Moran, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the Illinois HMO Act is a law that
"regulat[es] insurance," and was thus saved from preemption. 66
Upon appeal by Rush, in a decision long-awaited by health care
consumers, the Supreme Court determined definitively that an HMO
is an insurer,67 and held that the state law was saved from preemp-
tion.68 The Court relied on two methods in determining that the
HMO was an insurer. First, the Court applied a "common-sense view
of the matter," under which "a law must have not just an impact on
the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that
industry. '69 Next, the Court tested the results using three factors that,
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 70 spare insurance laws from fed-
eral preemption. 71 Its conclusion was that "the Illinois HMO Act is a
law 'directed toward' the insurance industry, and [is] an 'insurance
regulation' under a 'commonsense' view."72
The Court's determination that the HMO was an insurer, how-
ever, did not complete its analysis. Next, the Court turned to ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions to determine if the relief provided by
state law-HMO compliance with the external medical review deci-
sion-was in keeping with those remedies available under ERISA.73
While ERISA's civil enforcement procedures are not explicitly pre-
emptive, the Supreme Court has determined that these provisions are
the "exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and bene-
ficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits." 74
Applying this analysis, the Court recognized that the state law at
issue in Rush was not a remedies law and provided only for compli-
ance with the external medical review, and contained no provisions
for extra-contractual damages. 75 The Court thus viewed the Illinois
HMO Act as not providing any new cause of action or any new form of
relief.76 Because ERISA's own mechanisms provide the same relief-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 363-64.
67. Id. at 367.
68. Id. at 375.
69. Id. at 365-66 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987)).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
71. Rush, 536 U.S. at 365-66.
72. Id. at 373.
73. See id. at 377-80.
74. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
75. Rush, 536 U.S. at 379-80.
76. Id.
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reimbursement-for an improperly denied benefit; the Court was sat-
isfied that the state law's provisions did not provide a remedy that
"supplements or supplants" ERISA. 77 In a five-to-four vote, the Court
upheld Ms. Moran's right to reimbursement for the cost of an improp-
erly denied benefit as per the independent review's determination
that the procedure was medically necessary. 78
Because both ERISA and the Illinois HMO Act allow reimburse-
ment for the cost of a wrongly-denied benefit,79 it is not clear why Ms.
Moran did not take her claim to federal court, where it might have
proceeded more smoothly. A number of factors may explain this. Per-
haps state court was a timelier forum for her claim, or perhaps her
decision was affected by the unanimous jury requirement for federal
civil verdicts. Nevertheless, her choice of state court did not appear to
affect the Court's ruling. Importantly, her decision to proceed in state
court provided a needed opportunity for the Court to clarify that an
HMO was an insurer for ERISA purposes, and extend what one ERISA
commentator noted as an encouraging trend consistent with federalist
principles by the current Court towards respecting state law in tradi-
tional areas of state regulation.80
Although the Rush Court did not reach the issue of whether a
state insurance law saved from ERISA must undergo further scrutiny
to determine if its remedies exceed those offered by ERISA, the Court
noted that in the event of such a conflict, the state insurance regula-
tion would lose out if it provided plan participants the types of reme-
dies that Congress rejected in ERISA.1 If such a conflict existed,
pointing to its prior holding in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,82 the
Court emphasized that the savings clause must stop short of sub-
verting the congressional intent for the federal remedy to displace
state causes of action.8 3 Interestingly, the Court recognized that it had
not yet been asked to decide a case where this was at issue.8 4 The
Court nonetheless opined:
Although we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the
congressional policies of exclusive federal remedies and the "reser-
vation of the business of insurance to the States," we have antici-
77. See id. at 378-79.
78. Id. at 387.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (2000); HMO Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10
(2001).
80. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 955-60.
81. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 377.
82. 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
83. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 377.
84. See id.
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pated such a conflict, with the state insurance regulation losing out
if it allows plan participants "to obtain remedies ... that Congress
rejected in ERISA."8 5
As a result of Rush, an ERISA-governed HMO patient may sue
under state HMO law. This is encouraging. However, such a patient
does not yet have a remedy available beyond reimbursement for the
cost of a denied benefit. Accordingly, the Corcoran wrongful death ac-
tion would still be barred, and the HMO would remain immunized
against accountability for the harmful effects of its cost-saving deci-
sions. Justice will not be served as long as the courts interpret ERISA's
savings clause so narrowly as to cancel its effect if the law at issue offers
remedies in excess of those of ERISA.
HI. Analysis of ERISA Preemption After Rush
A. Text and Legislative History
Once a claim is saved from ERISA preemption because it falls
under state insurance law, it should not be subject to any implied pre-
emptive force of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. This section
will demonstrate that neither the text nor legislative history of ERISA's
savings clause require that state laws otherwise saved from preemption
be precluded from exemption because they include remedial provi-
sions that exceed those of ERISA. First, the relationship between the
preemption provision and the savings clause is examined. Second, the
interrelationship between the savings clause and the civil enforcement
provisions is discussed.
1. Relationship Between ERISA's Preemption Provision and
Savings Clause
The text of the saving clause states: "[N] othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance. 8 6 The plain meaning of this text
makes clear that any state law regulating insurance should require no
further qualification in order to be saved from ERISA preemption.
The results of an examination of the legislative history of ERISA's
preemption and ERISA's savings clause are not as clear. At the time of
its enactment, ERISA represented a much-needed comprehensive re-
form of the private pension industry.87 Accordingly, ERISA's provi-
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B) (2000).
87. Bogan, supra note 16, at 964-65.
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sions address the fiduciary responsibilities of plan administrators, such
as reporting and disclosure requirements.88 Because the legislation's
effect was so broad, encompassing big business and labor interests,
political compromise necessarily came into play.
8 9
Congress was balancing two competing interests. On one hand,
Congress wanted to encourage employers to offer retirement plans.Y0
Because these plans were voluntary, it was important for Congress to
not make the process of doing so onerous. On the other hand, ex-
isting fraud and other forms of pension fund abuse required place-
ment of burdens on employers in order to ensure that covered
workers received fair benefits.91 The statute was created envisioning a
single set of rules to govern the private pension industry.9 2 The pur-
pose of the resultant uniformity was to enable "administrators, fiducia-
ries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions
without the necessity of reference to varying state laws."93
The initial versions of ERISA passed by both the House and Sen-
ate provided exactly that-preemption over state laws that involved
matters that ERISA regulated.9 4 If that had been the final outcome,
federal preemption would not have applied to non-pension employee
benefit plan participants because ERISA does not regulate insurance
or medical care. ERISA's conference committee, however, influenced
by lobbying interests, expanded ERISA's preemption language by en-
larging the field of laws subject to ERISA preemption to "any and all
state laws that relate to" an ERISA plan.9 5
ERISA's broadened preemption clause was added at the last min-
ute, and the bill was rushed through Congress to meet its signing date
on Labor Day in 1974.96 After extensively reviewing ERISA's legislative
history, one commentator reports that in the process, the preemption
change escaped congressional analysis altogether.9 7
88. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114.
89. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Pre-
emption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 105, 117 (2001).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 118.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 128.
94. See id. at 118.
95. See id. at 119; Bogan, supra note 16, at 983.
96. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 978.
97. Levinson, supra note 12, at 23.
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The Supreme Court has noted the inherent ambiguity in the in-
teraction between ERISA's express preemption clause and the savings
clause:
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces,
perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for while the gen-
eral pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the saving[s]
clause appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power
over much of the same regulation. While Congress occasionally de-
cides to return to the States what it has previously taken away, it
does not normally do both at the same time.9
8
[T] here is no indication in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of the new prominence given the saving[s] clause in light of
the rewritten pre-emption clause, or was aware that the saving[s]
clause was in conflict with the general pre-emption provision.9 9
Congress's purpose in enacting the savings clause was apparently
to ensure that state insurance, banking, and securities law would con-
tinue to govern pension plan investment transactions. 100 However,
ERISA's expanded preemption provision ended up nullifying state
laws even where ERISA did not provide alternatives. Therefore, the
role of the savings clause in preserving state law causes of action for
employee beneficiaries of plans with claims of wrongdoing by insur-
ance companies and HMOs unexpectedly increased in significance.
2. Relationship Between ERISA's Savings Clause and Civil
Enforcement Provisions
ERISA's section 502 civil enforcement provisions do not contain
any express preemption language and do not require that their reme-
dies be exclusive. 101 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has concluded
that state laws that create additional remedies are preempted. 10 2 Jus-
tice Thomas, in his dissent in Rush, explained: "Such exclusivity of
remedies is necessary to further Congress' interest in establishing a
uniform federal law of employee benefits so that employers are en-
couraged to provide benefits to their employees."10 3
Congressional records on ERISA describe the legislation's inten-
tion that a body of federal substantive common law would be "devel-
oped by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
98. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985).
99. Id. at 745.
100. Bogan, supra note 89, at 119.
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
102. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
103. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 388 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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under private welfare ... plans." 10 4 After all, the Court reasoned, the
expectation of the development of federal common law under ERISA
did not have any purpose unless Congress intended to exclude state
law from supplementing or supplanting ERISA remedies.10 5 However,
in the areas of health care and insurance, no such body of law has
evolved in twenty-eight years.
Assuming, arguendo, that the interpretation is correct and that
generally section 502 has an implied preemptive effect, the narrower
issue is whether it is applicable to those laws that avoid preemption
through the savings clause. ERISA's text is silent on the intended re-
sults when a state law is expressly saved because it "relates to insur-
ance" but could be impliedly preempted because its remedies exceed
those provided by section 502.106 Importantly, when read for its plain
meaning, satisfaction of the savings clause requirement involves only
one criterion: the law must "regulate insurance."'1 7 If Congress in-
tended an additional requirement-that the law's remedies must not
exceed ERISA's-then how can this omission be explained?
One argument relied on by some courts to support the exclusivity
of section 502 is that ERISA was closely modeled after the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act ("LMRA"). 108 Because the LMRA's remedies
are explicitly exclusive, courts have inferred that ERISA section 502
remedial provisions must also be intended to be exclusive. 0 9 This rea-
soning, however, is unsound. The LMRA has no savings provisions
comparable to ERISA's. 110 Therefore, the LMRA fails to offer any gui-
dance on the narrower issue at hand-the interaction of the savings
clause with ERISA's section 502 provisions."'
Neither ERISA's text nor intent suggests any required restriction
that the only insurance laws saved from preemption must be non-re-
medial. ERISA's overarching intent is clear. Workers needed better
protection and employers needed incentives to offer fair benefits to
employees. Employees needed greater disclosure of information from
employers about the status of their pension funds. Pension plan ad-
ministrators needed uniformity to make the administration of pension
plan benefits manageable. A law intended to protect workers' rights
104. Bogan, supra note 16, at 981 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974)).
105. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56.
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A).
107. Id.
108. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
109. See id. at 55-56.
110. Bogan, supra note 89, at 158.
111. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 20-21.
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regarding pension fund abuse that, as an unanticipated offshoot, sig-
nificantly diminishes employee rights regarding health care benefits
and unwittingly protects the managed care industry from accountabil-
ity, cannot credibly be said to be applied correctly. If common sense
has any place in the law, the judiciary must recognize this reality.
3. Dicta as Basis for the Implied Preemptive Power of ERISA's
Civil Enforcement Provisions
The Court's conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
have preemptive power as applied to state law otherwise saved from
preemption is based on dicta. The term dicta typically refers to state-
ments in ajudicial opinion that are unnecessary to support the court's
decision.112 Dicta is not considered to be binding authority.11 3 Be-
cause there is widespread lack of consensus as to how to distinguish
dicta from holding, dicta can be and is confused with precedent. 1 4 If,
however, the Court relied on dicta rather than holding in Rush, then
it was not truly precedent and the Court can therefore revise its hold-
ing in future opinions without risking the disruption that can be asso-
ciated with overturning precedent.
An analysis of ERISA's preemption issues from the perspective of
the dicta/holding distinction suggests that the Court has improperly
applied the force of law to its own dicta to the detriment of ERISA's
true intent and proper application.
The Court's opinion in Pilot Life, that ERISA remedies are the
exclusive vehicle for a claim covered by ERISA,115 has been relied
upon frequently in subsequent opinions regarding ERISA preemp-
tion. 116 In Pilot Life, Mr. Dedeaux was injured at work and sought per-
manent disability benefits under an employer-based, ERISA-governed
policy from the Pilot Life Insurance Company. 1 7 When Pilot Life ter-
minated his benefits, Dedeaux sued on various Mississippi laws related
to bad faith, seeking general and punitive damages.118 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the state claim
was preempted because 1) the state law did not fall under the exemp-
112. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).
113. Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972).
114. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000-09 (1994)
(discussing the confusion regarding the dicta/holding distinction).
115. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
116. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1997); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLen-
don, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990); F.M.C. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
117. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43.
118. Id.
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tion for law that "regulates insurance,"' 1 9 and 2) "most importantly,
the clear expression of congressional intent [is] that ERISA's civil en-
forcement scheme be exclusive." 120 The Court first reasoned that to
"regulate insurance," the law "must not just have an impact on the
insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that in-
dustry."12' Accordingly, the Court found that because the bad faith
law applied more broadly-to any bad faith breach of contract-the
law was not saved from preemption. 122
Although this conclusion should have ended the Court's analysis
of the issue, the Court inexplicably went past the point of necessity to
analyze the law based on its remedial provisions. In dicta, the Court
decided that the interpretation of the savings clause should be in-
formed by the legislative intent concerning ERISA's remedies provi-
sions. 123 In essence, the Court added a new requirement for a law to
qualify under the savings clause exemption, in addition to regulating
insurance-whether its remedies exceed those offered by ERISA. The
Court found that the language, structure, and legislative history of ER-
ISA required the conclusion that its civil enforcement provisions were
meant to be an exclusive remedy, further justifying its conclusion that
the Mississippi law was not preempted. 24 This assumption, that Con-
gress applied its prohibition of any remedies not set forth in ERISA to
those laws appropriately saved from preemption via the savings clause,
has improperly rendered the savings clause meaningless for any state
law with state extra-contractual remedies.
An intriguing explanation has been offered for the Court's diver-
sion in Pilot Life from a focused savings clause analysis to an analysis
concerning section 502. One ERISA commentator reported that the
Court was inadequately briefed on the issue. 125 The commentator cri-
tiqued the briefs filed in support of the respondent insured as woe-
fully insufficient.' 26 He noted that the brief was a total of only
seventeen pages, and contained no discussion of the issue of the ex-
clusivity of the remedies provision other than to cite the savings clause
itself.127 Furthermore, the Solicitor General's amicus brief urging the
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 50.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 52.
124. Id. 52-53.
125. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 24.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Court to accept certiorari contained just three paragraphs in support
of the exclusivity of remedies as relevant to a savings clause analysis.' 2 8
Subsequently, however, in UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v.
Ward,129 the United States Solicitor General reversed his prior stance
on this issue, stating: "Congress has saved state substantive law, and it
is not clear why Congress would have wanted to foreclose all access to
state-created remedies or sanctions to enforce that substantive law, es-
pecially where the causes of action provided under [s] ection 502 itself
are not suited to that purpose."'
130
Nonetheless, the section 502 analysis from Pilot Life has been re-
garded as holding, or law.'13 However, an analysis of section 502 for
determining whether a state law "regulates insurance" is superfluous,
because anything not essential to the Court's opinion is non-binding
dicta. The Court did not need to reach the issue of comparing the
Mississippi bad faith law remedies with ERISA's remedies to decide
the issue of whether the law regulated insurance; 13 2 in fact, it should
not have even commented on the issue. In applying the savings clause,
the Court is asked only to determine if the law at issue "regulates in-
surance." Surely, the nature of its remedies does not shed light on the
issue of whether the law regulates insurance.
Because Pilot Life was decided over fifteen years ago, the Court
has had opportunity to apply the dicta to subsequent cases, reaching
the same outcome. 33 As a result, what was once non-binding dicta has
in fact become holding. Accordingly, any future shift in the Court's
view would compromise stare decisis. Stare decisis suggests that when
128. Id.
129. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 22-23, UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868) (citation omitted).
131. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1997); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLen-
don, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990); F.M.C. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
132. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
133. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142 (holding that a state law wrongful discharge
claim was expressly preempted by ERISA where the plaintiff alleged that Ingersoll-Rand
Company fired him in order to avoid contributing to his pension fund); Kanne v. Conn.
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions impliedly preempted a state law insurance remedy that would otherwise have
been saved from preemption); In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a state law refusal to pay insurance benefits claim was preempted
because ERISA's civil enforcement provisions are intended to be exclusive); Ramirez v.
Inter-Cont'l Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that state law contract,
tort, and statutory claims attempting to recover medical benefits due under an employer
health benefit plan were preempted because allowing recovery under state law would be
inconsistent with the congressional intent explicated in Pilot Life).
[Vol. 38
an earlier decision has not proven unworkable, and where overturn-
ing it would damage reliance interests, the earlier decision should not
be overturned. 134 However, earlier decisions have proven unworkable.
The cases decided since Pilot Life, culminating in Rush, have increas-
ingly rendered the savings clause ineffectual. Furthermore, in consid-
ering any reliance interests on the part of an HMO that could be
harmed should precedent be overturned, the point can be made that
this reliance is both an inadvertent and illegitimate byproduct of ER-
ISA law. Besides, shielding an HMO from liability should be void as
against the public policy favoring protection of the rights of health
care consumers.
4. Statutory Interpretation, the Savings Clause, and Civil
Enforcement Provisions
By applying two established principles of statutory interpretation,
ERISA can be properly interpreted to allow state remedial law claims
against HMOs. First, the presumption against preemption in matters
involving traditional areas of state governance should control. Second,
when resolving internal inconsistencies within a statute, express provi-
sions should supersede implicit ones, and when an interpretation of
one provision renders another meaningless, that interpretation
should be rejected.
The first and most relevant statutory construction principle is that
the courts should not interpret federal statutes to preempt state law in
traditional areas of state governance unless the federal government
unambiguously requires such a construction.1 35 Yet, ERISA's preemp-
tion provisions are known for their ambiguity. 36 Accordingly, the
Court in Pilot Life was unable to support its conclusion that ERISA's
enforcement provisions act as a bar to a plan participant's access to
state insurance law remedies by anything more than inference, 137 be-
cause neither the explicit text nor the legislative intent of ERISA
guided the Court to clarity. Therefore, in the absence of clear intent,
the law should not be preempted.
134. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
135. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995).
136. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that given the Court's (then) eighteen
opinions on ERISA preemption, this continuing involvement in ERISA preemption provi-
sions suggests lack of clarity about the law).
137. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-54.
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Support of preemption through an inference alone does not sat-
isfy this rule of statutory interpretation. In the matter of non-pension
plan benefits, ERISA's savings clause has produced considerable con-
fusion. When no clarification can be found textually or from congres-
sional intent, the rule of statutory interpretation requires that the law
at issue not be preempted. 138
A second principle of statutory interpretation comes into play
when different portions of a statute appear to contradict one another.
As has been described, ERISA's civil enforcement provisions can re-
verse the protection against preemption provided by the savings
clause. Given this, the issue becomes how to resolve the dilemma of
internal inconsistency in ERISA.
As an illustration, consider the California Managed Care Health
Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999.139 As a result of Rush's
holding that an HMO is an insurer, 140 in an ERISA-related matter the
law would almost certainly be considered to be one that "regulates
insurance" and therefore saved from ERISA preemption. Yet, because
the statute permits the recovery of all available tort damages,1 41 it
could, and almost certainly would, be preempted if the Court applied
the impliedly preemptive force of section 502. In Rush, the Court's
analysis reflected a willingness to permit what is at most an impliedly
preemptive force of the civil enforcement clause to supersede the ex-
press non-preemption provisions of the savings clause. As importantly,
the Court seemed not to recognize the statutory inconsistency inher-
ent in this approach. Express preemption provisions should control
over implied preemption provisions.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the interpretations of ERISA's sav-
ings clause and its civil enforcement provisions are each reasonable,
how should a court decide which provision controls? Typically courts
rely on text and legislative intent. The intent of the savings clause is
ambiguous. However, the language of the clause is not ambiguous.
Regardless, neither textual analysis nor legislative intent has thus far
resolved this issue.
One method employed by the courts in resolving an internal in-
consistency of a statute is to apply a construction of the conflicting
138. See N.Y. State Conference, 514 U.S. at 655.
139. Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.
§ 3428 (West Supp. 2002).
140. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 367 (2002).
141. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 3428(j) (West Supp. 2003) (including as damages recover-




language that harmonizes with the purposes of each section. 142 Rather
than being guided by a single sentence of a statute, the Court looks to
the law in its entirety, including its object and policy basis.143 In keep-
ing with this principle, one ERISA-preemption commentator sug-
gested a straightforward judicial solution to the conflict at issue. 144
The Court could simply identify a bright-line boundary that regards
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions to be exclusive regarding all mat-
ters except any state law that regulates insurance. 145 This would mean
that state law, saved from preemption under ERISA's savings clause,
could include remedial provisions and enable claimants to recover ex-
tra-contractual damages when warranted.
"Statutory interpretations that 'render superfluous other provi-
sions in the same enactment' are strongly disfavored." 46 The pre-
sumption is that congressional purpose for each provision is intended
to be harmonious with the law's overall purpose. 147 The application of
this principle is as follows. If an interpretation of ERISA's civil en-
forcement provisions negates the savings clause exemption for a law
that regulates insurance, the savings clause would be superfluous. This
rendering of the savings clause as meaningless suggests that any such
interpretation of the civil enforcement provisions should be rejected.
B. Conflict Preemption Analysis of the Savings Clause and Civil
Enforcement Provisions
ERISA's preemption provision 148 has been analyzed mistakenly as
field preemption. 149 The Court should instead apply conflict preemp-
tion analysis, sparing state remedial law from preemption, because
this poses no inherent conflict with ERISA's core purpose.
Preemption analysis begins with the United States Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI states: "This Constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
142. NORMANJ. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 103 (5th ed. 1992);
see also Bogan, supra note 16, at 953; Bogan, supra note 89, at 155.
143. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
144. See Bogan, supra note 89, at 155.
145. See id.
146. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 609 (1998) (citations
omitted).
147. SINGER, supra note 142, at 105.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1999) (providing that ERISA provisions shall "supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan").
149. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 980-81 (describing congressional confusion between
conflict versus field preemption in relation to ERISA).
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• . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ,150 The scope of
preemption is determined using two categories. 15' The first, field pre-
emption, also known as complete preemption, is found when Con-
gress demonstrates the intent to entirely occupy a field of law. 152 It
arises when the scheme of federal regulation is so comprehensive as to
reasonably infer that Congress left no room for supplementary state
regulation. 53 In cases involving field preemption, the court must de-
fine the limits of the field Congress intended the law to preempt.154
The second type, conflict preemption, occurs when Congress has not
completely preempted a field, but a conflict exists between state and
federal law. 155 This arises when the conflict is significant enough that
it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, 15 6 or where
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."157
In interpreting the preemptive effect of a federal statute, courts
should look to the structure and purpose of the law to divine congres-
sional intent regarding the relationship between federal and state
law.' 58 This includes scrutiny of any express preemption instructions.
However, express preemption provisions should be examined with the
assumption that Congress intended them to advance the overall goals
of the legislation. 59
Through the broad and expansive language of ERISA's preemp-
tion provision, Congress suggested its intention to make the entire
field of employee benefits an exclusively federal matter. 160 Addition-
ally, the savings clause was interpreted very narrowly.161 However, the
application of complete preemption in the non-pension employee
plan areas of health care and insurance has had harsh results.162 After
all, ERISA provides no substantive law in those areas.163 Therefore, if
the state law is preempted, a regulatory vacuum occurs. Furthermore,
150. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
151. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
152. Bogan, supra note 16, at 961.
153. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
154. Bogan, supra note 16, at 985.
155. See id. at 961-62.
156. Hillsborough County v. Auto. Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
157. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
158. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 963.
159. See id.
160. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-99 (1983).
161. See Bogan, supra note 89, at 127-28 (describing the Court's narrow interpretation
of the savings clause in Pilot Life).
162. See Bogan, supra note 16, at 996-97.
163. See id. at 973-76.
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if complete preemption occurs, plan beneficiaries are left with se-
verely limited avenues for redress.
Regardless, the Court in Pilot Life determined that ERISA com-
pletely preempts state law in the field of employee welfare plans.1 64
Emphasizing that the question of whether a certain state action is pre-
empted by federal law is one of congressional intent, and that "[t] he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone," the Court relied on
its earlier opinions that the express preemption provisions are deliber-
ately expansive and designed to establish pension plan regulation ex-
clusively as a federal concern.1 65
In applying a field preemption analysis, the Court in Pilot Life
missed the mark in two different ways. First, it assumed that the com-
plete preemption referred to in the regulation of pension plan funds
applied equally to ERISA oversight of non-pension funds. Second, the
Court ignored the savings clause. The savings clause provision reserves
to the states the traditional state matter of insurance regulation; 166 law
with provisions for a preemption exception by definition rules out a
complete preemption approach. The only alternative is a conflict pre-
emption model.
In its more recent cases, the Court has moved away from a com-
plete preemption model and has applied more properly a conflict pre-
emption analysis to ERISA claims that invoke the savings clause in
order to proceed under state law. 167 In the recently-decided Rush case,
in addition to determining that the state law was saved from preemp-
tion because it emanated from a law that regulated insurance, 16 the
Court also discussed Ms. Moran's claim to see if the relief sought was
consistent with ERISA's civil enforcement provisions as understood in
light of ERISA's overall purpose.1 69
The Court found that the Illinois HMO Act, 170 under which Ms.
Moran asserted a claim for enforcement of the independent medical
review board's decision, 171 did not conflict with ERISA because it did
not create a new cause of action nor provide a new form of ultimate
164. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
165. Id. at 45-46 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985),
quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978), quoting Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b) (2) (A) (2000).
167. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379-80 (2002).
168. Id. at 387.
169. Id. at 379-80.
170. HMO Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2000).
171. Rush, 536 U.S. at 363.
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relief.' 72 Instead, the Court likened Moran's claim to the common
practice of obtaining a second opinion to ensure sound medical judg-
ment rather than any additional remedy beyond ERISA's existing en-
forcement scheme. 173 While the decision to allow Ms. Moran's claim
to proceed is not insignificant, what is most encouraging is the Court's
use of a conflict, rather than a field, preemption analysis to reach this
result. 174
However, the particular conflict identified by the Supreme Court
for analysis was incorrect. The Court in Rush examined Moran's claim
in light of its faithfulness to Congress's desire for uniformity of its
enforcement mechanisms. 175 Uniformity of enforcement provisions
under ERISA was not core to ERISA's purpose, but rather a mecha-
nism for structuring the legislation to encourage more employers to
offer welfare plans. 176 The core purpose of ERISA was to protect work-
ers' pension plan funds. 177 Congress also extended that protection to
non-pension benefit plans, to protect "the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries."'178 Therefore, the fo-
cus of the Court should have been on whether Moran's claim was
faithful to ERISA's employee-protective core. When examined in this
light, there is no conflict between sparing state remedial insurance
laws from preemption and protecting workers' rights. Ironically, a
conflict only emerges when the Court interprets the preemption pro-
vision so as not to exempt these kinds of laws from preemption. When
this is the case, ERISA's goal of protection for employees is not met.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.179 provides a useful example of the
Court's ability to achieve a harmonious coexistence of state and fed-
eral law in a matter affecting both. While concerned with a different
body of law from ERISA-the Atomic Energy Act-its illustration of
the allowance of recovery under state law within an area highly regu-
lated by federal law is instructive. The Silkwood Court upheld a state
award of punitive damages for radiation injuries against preemption
by federal law.18 0 The defendants contended that state law was in con-
flict with federal law in two ways: 1) with the purpose of the federal
172. Id. at 379-80.
173. Id. at 383-84.
174. See id. at 379-80.
175. See id.
176. See Bogan, supra note 89, at 117.
177. See Grosso, supra note 28, at 441.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
179. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
180. See id. at 258.
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Atomic Energy Act to encourage widespread participation in the utili-
zation and development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and
2) with congressional intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation
hazards. 181 However, the Court was satisfied that the federal Atomic
Energy Act evidenced no intention to bar the states from providing
remedies for those suffering injuries from radiation in a nuclear
plant.1 82 Referring to damages for radiation, the Court said:
[P] re-emption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal
Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that
state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcil-
able conflict between the federal and state standards or whether
the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frus-
trate the objectives of the federal law.183
The Court ruled that even though civil fines under federal law
may be imposed, it was not inconsistent to additionally impose state-
based punitive damages.' 8 4 In rejecting the claim that it was inconsis-
tent with congressional intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation
hazards, the Court did not find it inconsistent to vest the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety
aspects of nuclear development while allowing plaintiffs to recover on
state-based claims for tortious harm. 85
As an analogy, Silkwood offers a flexible model for conflict pre-
emption analysis. It demonstrates that states can appropriately regu-
late and enforce law even when federal law is involved, preserving the
concept of federalism.
IV. Proposals for Change
Solutions to the ERISA preemption quagmire can constructively
originate in either the legislature or the courts. The legislature has
made some efforts towards this end. Both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate formed their own versions of law addressing pa-
tients' rights. The Norwood-Dingell Bill of Rights, a bill that first
originated in the House of Representatives in 1997,186 included provi-
sions amending ERISA so as to permit injured HMO patients to sue in
181. Id. at 257.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 256.
184. See id. at 256-57.
185. See id.
186. Melanie Eversley, Norwood Revives Patients' Rights Bill-Few in Congress Willing to
Sign On, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 9, 2003, at A4.
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state courts. 18 7 Both the House and Senate versions of the patients'
rights legislation remained deadlocked over the politically charged is-
sue of how much liability HMOs should have in consumer lawsuits,'188
until the bill eventually died in the Senate in August, 2002.189 Repre-
sentative Charlie Norwood introduced another version of the Bill in
February of 2003.190 This version was so compromised from the origi-
nal Norwood-Dingell Bill that Representative John Dingell would not
support it, likening its power, or lack thereof, to a "car without an
engine." 19 1
Greater HMO liability is not without its costs to consumers. Af-
fordability of health care could be compromised if HMOs were forced
to absorb the increased costs of either preventing or responding to
litigation. With many people in the country already unable to afford
health care coverage at all, this concern is admittedly valid. Though
no easy solution presents itself, Congress should not be excused from
developing legislation that better balances the current inequity of
HMO protection from liability at great consumer cost.
Change is also possible through the judiciary. After all, in fashion-
ing ERISA, Congress gave latitude to the courts in its interpretation
and application, recognizing that proper balancing is inherently sub-
ject to changing conditions. 192 At the time of ERISA's formation, the
primary concern was the proper balance between protecting the re-
tirement interests of employees and fostering further pension plan
formation. 193 Determining exactly what ERISA was aimed at cor-
recting or balancing, if anything, in terms of health care and insur-
ance benefits at its time of formation may never be possible.
Regardless, the courts' primary responsibility regarding ERISA pre-
emption in health care issues at this time is to balance the interests of
consumers against the interest of the health care delivery system. Ad-
mittedly, achieving such a balance is challenging. Nonetheless, the in-
terests of justice would be well-served by a clear correction favoring
the interests of the consumer.
187. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 274.
188. Janet Hook, Negotiation Fails on Bill of Rights for HMO Patients Health: Democrats Are
Unable to Reach a Deal With the White House, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A20.
189. Id.
190. See Eversley, supra note 186.
191. Id.





Congress apparently failed to consider the effect of the preemp-
tion provision on health care plans. Even if it had, it could not have
anticipated the fundamental change in health care delivery that has
come about through the dominance of a managed care, cost-contain-
ment model. Congress's decision to leave state insurance laws intact
through ERISA's savings clause may not have been clearly intended to
leave an avenue open for plan beneficiaries to pursue state law redress
for claims related to health care or insurance benefits. What is clear is
that Congress could not have intended ERISA to offer HMOs a safe
harbor against negligent or intentional tortious conduct. Accordingly,
arming plan participants with adequate, remedies has never been
more important.
In the 1960s, the cost of medical care increased substantially. 194
In response, HMOs, designed to control costs by .managing the deliv-
ery of health care, began their rise to prominence. 195 At this same
time, ERISA was enacted. 196 ERISA's effect on managed care has been
to shield managed care organizations from liability for harm
caused. 197
A dilemma inevitably arises for the courts in their efforts to apply
law that is, at best, ambiguous, and at worst, out of step with current
realities. Short of much-needed legislative reform of ERISA, the judici-
ary must apply ERISA in light of the reality that health care and insur-
ance are matters traditionally regulated by the state, and as such,
there is no substantive law within ERISA with which to regulate and
govern health care delivery. Moreover, principles of federalism re-
quire the presumption against preemption when legislative history re-
garding preemption is ambiguous. Furthermore, courts should
recognize that to distinguish non-remedial state insurance laws from
remedial state insurance laws in an analysis of whether a law is saved
from ERISA preemption has no support in the text of the savings
clause or in ERISA's fundamental purpose of safeguarding employee
rights.
Conclusion
It is too soon to evaluate fully Rush's impact. The Pilot Life ques-
tion discussed in Rush-whether the civil enforcement provisions are
194. Jeffrey W. Stempel & Nadia von Magdenko, Doctors, HMOs, ERISA, and the Public
Interest After Pegram v. Herdrich, 36 TORT & INS. L. J. 687, 704 (2001).
195. Id.
196. See THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, INC., supra note 24, at v.
197. Grosso, supra note 28, at 435.
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impliedly preemptive-while of major significance for ERISA litiga-
tion, remains unresolved. Significantly, however, since the ruling in
Rush that the state HMO law at issue qualified under the savings
clause and was outside the reach of ERISA preemption, 98 the Court
in a subsequent unanimous decision affirmed a Sixth Circuit ruling
upholding two state laws requiring health insurers to open their pro-
vider lists to any qualified providers willing to agree to its terms.1 99
The laws were not preempted by ERISA because, like the state law in
Rush, they, too, were laws that regulated insurance. 200 Because the
Kentucky laws contained no remedial provisions, 201 no section 502
analysis was needed. Thus it remains that since Rush, the Court has
not addressed preemption of a state law that regulates insurance but
provides remedies that supplant or supplement ERISA's section 502
provisions.
In fact, neither has the Court pre-Rush directly reached this issue.
The Court's prior opinions involved either non-remedial insurance
laws that were held as saved from preemption, or laws-remedial or
otherwise-that did not meet the "regulate insurance" savings clause
requirement and were thus preempted. For those states, including
California, whose HMO laws provide extra-contractual remedies, 20 2
further litigation will be necessary to clarify the viability of remedial
provisions beyond those of ERISA.
In conclusion, it must be underscored that congressional intent
with regard to ERISA's authority over non-pension employee welfare
plans in general remains mysterious and, to many ERISA experts, il-
logical. Even more confusing is congressional intent with regard to
those laws that regulate insurance, and that would accordingly be
saved from preemption but whose remedial provisions exceed those
of ERISA. The Court's strong suggestion that ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provisions nullify the savings clause when state remedial law is
involved remains unsatisfying in the light of federalism and the his-
toric allocation of control over matters of health and insurance to the
states.
This comment proposes statutory analysis and interpretation that,
when applied, will enable the Court to abandon its current savings
clause analysis practice of differentiating state insurance law on the
198. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002).
199. See Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003).
200. See id.
201. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-171(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2003).
202. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West Supp. 2002).
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basis of whether it is remedial. In so doing, the Court will be following
the constitutionally-bound imperative to reserve to the states the ap-
propriate right to govern in the matter of the health and safety of its
citizens.
The Court's position in Rush, though dicta, that a state HMO law
considered saved from ERISA preemption would be "unsaved" if its
remedies exceed or supplant those of ERISA, is untenable. It is this
commentator's best hope that the unavoidable recognition of this will
lead to a shift in the interpretation of ERISA preemption law to be
more consistent with ERISA's fundamental purpose of safeguarding
and enhancing workers' rights and benefits. After all, bereaved par-
ents like the Corcorans deserve no less.
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